The ‘Great Game’ – this is what they used to call the confrontation between Russia and England in late 19th - early 20th century in Central and Middle Asia. The territory of Afghanistan and Iran where Great Britain that kept India under control and Russia that prevailed in Turkestan (Central Asia) both wanted to get hold of served as the battlefield in this cold war of two centuries ago. Interestingly, last month there were two major publications (The New York Times and, twice, Foreign Policy) that went back to the ‘historical problem’ of ‘strategic interests’ of the west and the U.S. in this region. What are western nations seeking in the region, who and how do they want to ‘protect’ from whom, and what are the forecasts for the years to come?
The history of confrontation of superpowers in Central and Middle Asia. The Great Game is over to… go ablaze again
Experts of the Masterforex-V Trading Academy point out that the Great Game:
• was played by England and Russia with changing success and wasn’t over even after the 1917 socialist revolution in Russia. The Soviet Union, the successor of the Tsar’s empire, started actively struggling and even made significant progress here;
• essentially, the USSR beat England in the 1930-1940s on this front by establishing the Soviet rule, overcoming basmatches (who were actively supported by the British Crown) and, after the Second World War and the collapse of the British empire, London was forced itself to give up its ambitions leaving not only Afghanistan and Iran in peace, but also huge India (which later split into a few states: India itself, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka);
• inspired by this successful victory over Great Britain, Moscow started promoting its advance and increasing its presence in the region. This self-confident policy culminated in invasion of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan in 1979;
• however, soon the Afghan war became one of the reasons for the collapse of the Soviet Union itself. England’s place in the Great Game was gradually taken over by theU.S. that treated defeat of the Soviet forces in Afghanistan as its victory;
• the winning nation, already habitually, started building on its success and set out in early 1990s to oust the Russians not only from the Middle Asia, but also from Kazakhstan and Transcaucasia. Sheila Heslin, an expert of the U.S. National Security Council, then developed a strategy for Washington’s policy in these regions. She suggested offering Transcaucasian and Middle-Asian nations a financial channel independent from Moscow. It was to be the pipeline Baku-Jeikhan – the first non-Russian transport route joining Caucasus and Turkey. It helped the region’s countries to gain a significant potential of political autonomy under the guise of billions of oil dollars that strengthened their economy;
• the pipeline Baku-Jeikhan was put into operation in 2006 but failed to drastically change the geopolitical situation in the region. The matter is that the U.S. had itself got pretty confused in the Great Game by this time. Invasion of Afghanistan by the American forces in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 further destabilized the region and, most importantly, failed to strengthen Washington’s position. On the contrary, this only shook it;
• an unconvincing ‘victory’ of the U.S. in Iraq and a very likely defeat in Afghanistan forced the U.S. Department of the State to start thinking about a total review of its policies in central Asia and even probably withdrawal from the Great Game. But this would have been too much of a shame for great America to bow to weak Russia. This is when they invented ‘a reload’ in relationships with Moscow;
• basically, the very ‘reload of relationships’ and the U.S.-Russia friendship already implies an end to the Great Game, especially given that a third uninvited player got involved – dynamically developing China.
Will the United States withdraw from Central Asia?
It is absolutely clear that superpowers won’t leave Central Asia be, according to most analysts. China and Russia border on this region, the U.S. maintains its largest military presence and military operations spending staggering amounts for these. However, it is America where serious disputes are under the way about the need for presence in this restless region. Western media analysts have three opinions on this issue:
• the U.S. has to forget about Central Asia as the fully hopeless region of the planet.
• the U.S. has to stay there and fight for democracy and stand its ground to the last.
• the U.S. has to stay there but limit its presence to a minimum.
Arguments of those who suggest that the U.S. leave the hopeless region of Middle and Central Asia for good
Daniel W. Drezner, a reviewer at Foreign Policy, can be conventionally regarded as a proponent of the first point of view – that the U.S. leave the region saving dozens of billions of dollars. He briefly lays down his main arguments in his feature On Forfeiting the Great Game:
• launch of the pipeline Baku-Jeikhan solved absolutely nothing. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan wouldn’t connect to it at all;
• the ‘reload’ policy ‘gave up’ all post-soviet states of the region to Moscow. Subsequently, this resulted in destabilization in Kyrgyzstan, a slow departure from the pro-American stance of Azerbaijani government and many other things. This is why we shouldn’t delude ourselves: the region has already been given up;
• a thaw in Washington’s relationships with the President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov (who used to be regarded as the cruelest leader in Middle Asia) implies weakness of Barack Obama’s Administration;
• we should leave Central Asia to be ‘devoured’ by Russia and China. These ‘empires’ will have quite a few teeth broken in their struggle for this problem-ridden region. Neither country will achieve complete hegemony;
• most importantly, political autonomy of Middle Asian states or, as Drezner calls them, ‘camps’, is beyond any danger now. This is what the U.S.’s main achievement so far.
The reviewer confidently claims in a kind of summary of what he said: “Central Asia couldn’t be farther from the United States – if there is a region in the world where the U.S. should decrease its presence – this is it”.
Arguments of people who believe that the U.S. must stand their ground to the last in the region
The second point of view is represented by Daniel Drezner’s colleague in Foreign Policy, Steve LeVine. He claims that:
• when Washington already decided in the distant year of 1988 that their struggle for Central Asia had been won and waved away Afghanistan with Pakistan they had to go back suffering from significant losses. Likewise, there’s a huge likelihood to make a mistake by prematurely abandoning its claims in Central Asia;
• the new Chinese-Russian rivalry will not play the same balancing role as the U.S. presence. As a result, everyone will suffer;
• Washington had better take some pains and win at least eight U.S. allies in the region rather than give them up to its potential opponents.
• in terms of how remote the region is from the States, Steve LeVine argues that “…there’s only 57 miles between Uzbek town of Termez to the northern capital of Afghanistan, Mazar-i-Sharif, and another 189 miles to Kabul… Or have a look at Azerbaijani capital, Baku, which is 338 miles from Tehran. Kazakhstani capital, Almaty, is 537 miles away from the capital of western China, Urumchi. All these countries are linked to the U.S. main interests”. We leave the ‘expert’ to blame for ignorance of what is the current Kazakh capital.
Arguments of the 3rd group of analysts: the U.S. should stay in the region but cut down aid
Finally, the third point of few is expressed in The New York Times by its political reviewer, Thomas L. Friedman, who pretentiously called his opus “Great Double Game”. He believes that:
• America has to fight Afghanistan and Iraq in an understanding that its main enemies are Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. (This is where the 9/11 terrorist attack was allegedly masterminded). But a strike on them is impossible (Islamabad has an A-bomb, Riyadh – lots of oil). So the U.S. decided to surround them by conquering, respectively, Afghanistan and Iraq.
• by building a democratic society in Afghanistan and Iraq, Americans could change regimes both in Pakistan and the Kingdom of Saudis. This would allow taking the A-bomb and oil under control (Washington wants to think about Pakistani nuclear weapons as much as it does about Indian ones, but there’s still a long way to go);
• since these dreams were originally utopian (strangely enough, the Department of the State failed to understand this for a long time) they were in for inevitable fiasco. This, however, doesn’t mean at all that the U.S. should leave the region. On the contrary, this is where it has to stay to prevent final meltdown of such an explosive region into radical Islamism.
• this is why casualties will be necessary by maintaining oil production in Saudi Arabia and passing on weapons to Pakistan. Later it all fires at American soldiers but one has to put up with it as any other scenario could be much worse;
• as a possible way out, there is a weaker presence in Afghanistan and smaller purchases on Saudi oil so that ‘we can give less money to people that hate us and economic and political reforms can become a necessity to them, not entertainment’. But, as we understand, this is a weak comfort.
Market Leader suggests a survey for the situation to be assessed in a more unbiased manner: In your opinion, what does sentiment prevalent in the U.S. imply?
• complete surrender of the U.S. under B. Obama’s Administration;
• apathy of the American society and forfeiting of the superpower mission this country was set to carry out;
• calm and collected analysis of the context that will help make right conclusions and make the right decision.
